This and similar stories are a product of a storytelling exercise I offer in my EDM classes called” ‘It happened to me.’ I will let this story speak for itself. Please read through until the end.
On February 22, 2004, the Prince George’s County Fire/EMS Department responded to a three-story triplex house fire at 5014 Roseld Court, Oxon Hill, Maryland. While all occupants vacated the structure safely, the fire consumed the basement and portions of the first floor.
The Fire Chief tasked the Prince George’s County Fire/EMS Department Safety Investigation Team to conduct a thorough and detailed investigation into the circumstances that lead to the critical injury of a Fire Lieutenant, who inhaled toxic smoke and high heat when he became trapped with his partner and attempted to evacuate and/or call for help from a second floor window.
At the time, I was assigned as the Executive Assistant to the Public Safety Director for the County Executive and therefore the person in charge of overseeing this project. Prince George’s County, Maryland is a diverse and multicultural community bordering the eastern edges of our Nation’s Capital. Over 1,900 active career and volunteer personnel staff 46 fire/rescue stations, which protect 485 square miles and a population of over 833,000 residents.
On Sunday, February 22, 2004, at 16:34 hours, Prince George’s County Public Safety Communications (PSC) received a 911 call reporting a house on fire at 5014 Roseld Court, Oxon Hill, Maryland. Fire Investigations later determined the origin of the fire as the electric dryer in the basement. All occupants had vacated the residences before the arrival of Prince George’s County Fire/EMS Department units. Upon arrival, Engine 422 advised they had “heavy fire showing from the basement” of a three-story, end of the row, triplex. Chief 42B assumed Oxon Hill command. Command did not request the assignment to be upgraded from a street alarm to a box alarm.
Engine 422 attempted to attack the basement fire via the first floor interior stairs with a 2” attack line with a 1” stack tip nozzle, but was unable to make progress due to the tremendous heat and smoke rising up the stairwell.
Quint 21’s interior crew (operating as the first arriving special service) passed Engine 422 in the front hallway to search the first floor. They ventilated the window on side bravo as they went. Upon completion of the first floor search, they proceeded to the second floor. Quint 21’s exterior crew placed one ladder to the porch roof on side alpha. Attempts to place a second ladder to the side alpha second floor window were hampered by perceived electric lines. Their attempts to ventilate the second floor side alpha windows from the front porch roof were stopped by command due to safety concerns about the stability of the porch roof structure and perceived downed power lines. No further action was taken to ventilate these second floor windows. They did ventilate basement windows and control utilities.
When Engine 292’s aggressive interior fire attack extinguished a large portion of the fire in the basement, Engine 422’s crew was able to proceed down the steps into the basement. At this point, both engine crews and hose lines were operating in the basement, while Quint 21’s interior crew was on the second floor searching.
Command established Basement Division (Chief 21A), Division 1 (Chief 29), and Exposure Division 1 (Chief 21B). Upon assignment, no briefing was offered to division supervisors on the incident action plan and the units assigned to their respective divisions. There was little or no subsequent coordination and communication between these divisions and command, or between division supervisors and units. No safety officer was assigned, nor was a Rapid Intervention Crew (RIC) established. Command advised, “we have a line on the fire now, the fire in the basement and above, now bulk of the fire has been knocked.”
Engine 292’s attack line burst, possibly from the glass removed by Quint 21’s interior crew while ventilating the first floor side bravo window, and was being removed from the basement to be repaired. Extra personnel from Company 42 were in the process of bringing another line to the basement per command’s direction. The Division 1 supervisor (first floor) noted fire in the kitchen/living room near the floor and requested an attack line. The fire extended from the basement to the first floor where a ventilation duct went thru the basement ceiling to the first floor and via the exterior wall where the rear of the dryer joined the front wall. The fire developed rapidly on the first floor with no hose line in place. The Division 1 supervisor diverted the 2-1/2” replacement attack line being extended to the basement, by the extra personnel from Company 42, to the first floor. Command did not issue this order; Division 1 assumed it was the attack line he requested.
With rapid-fire development on the first floor, Quint 21’s interior crew noted an increase in the heat level on the second floor. The officer proceeded to the stairwell and saw fire consuming the first floor. He issued a mayday radio transmission, gathered his partner, and returned to the second floor window on side bravo, which he previously ventilated while searching the second floor. In an attempt to exit and/or call for help, he got up into the window at approximately the same time that fire extended out of the first floor side bravo window enveloping him in fire.
When Quint 21’s officer came back into the second floor bedroom from the window, his self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) regulator was not functional due to the regulator cover and diaphragm having been separated from the regulator body. The SCBA regulator front cover and diaphragm were later recovered in the outside basement stairwell below the second floor side bravo window. He and his partner, unaware of the nature of the problem with his regulator, attempted to “find” his regulator but were unsuccessful. The officer returned to the stairwell but it was still blocked by the fire on the first floor. He returned to the front bedroom. His partner attempted to get help by climbing up into the same window and waving for assistance. Personnel on the ground saw him and this information were forwarded to command.
Command did not implement department “mayday” procedures. Command had still not designated a RIC team. No RIC operational plan was developed, in place or instituted. No radio announcements were made about the name and/or location of any missing firefighter. No actions were taken to ensure current firefighting operations were continued to support any RIC operation.
Rescue Squad 27 preceded to the fire building from their staged position and saw the fire develop on the first floor. They attempted to place a ladder to the second floor side bravo window after the firefighter waving was noticed. While this was happening, Quint 21’s officer became incapacitated. His partner, unable to further assist and/or move him determined his only option was to attempt to leave via the interior stairwell and get assistance. He was unaware that someone noticed his waving out the window. He left the second floor, ran down the stairwell, through the flames, towards the front door. Once outside, he advised that his officer was still trapped on the second floor front bedroom. This information was communicated to the incident commander.
The driver of Engine 422, the officer from Engine 292, and the officer from Engine 322 heard about the missing firefighter (not from command) and abandoned their assigned duties to go get the missing officer from Quint 21. One enters via the front door, one via a ladder from side charlie and one via the basement stairwell. Rescue Squad 27 abandoned the side bravo laddering when called to side alpha by their officer. One half of the crew proceeded up the side alpha ladder to the porch roof while the other half entered the front door and got on the hose line. The three personnel who left their assignments found Quint 21’s officer in the second floor, quadrant A, front bedroom, under the side bravo window. His helmet, face piece and gloves had been removed. The three personnel, utilizing their own SCBA, started resuscitation efforts.
Although somewhat disorganized and hectic, Quint 21’s officer was removed via the front window onto the front porch roof and then down to the ground. He was turned over to the paramedics and flown via helicopter to MEDSTAR/Washington Hospital Burn Center.
Because of this, the Lieutenant spent six months in a hospital battling for his life. He did recover, however he sustained career ending damage to his body. During the incident numerous safety and departmental orders were violated by the commanding officer. The OIC was made aware of the downed firefighter, and did not initiate appropriate actions. As a result, of this investigation the department changed its policies and procedures and thereby created a safer environment for its members. It took one year for report to be published and for our department to begin to implement the recommendations. Knowing what I know now the department waited too long to implement the safety procedures from the study.
(Story provided with permission of APUS EDM master’s student
Tiffany Green, Assistant Fire Chief, Prince George’s County)
Ok, so other than being a fascinating story to read that teaches us much about command, control, communication, and intelligence (C3I in military terms), this student’s story serves as a stark reminder of the dangers that our EDM Heroes experience every day.
As an addendum to the story, Assistant Chief Green just notified me today that this tragedy: [link url=”http://www.cnn.com/2016/04/16/us/maryland-firefighters-shot/index.html” title=”Maryland Firefighters Shot“] responding to call, just happened in her department under her watch. However much soul-searching and family support occurred in her storied incident, that will likely be magnified tenfold now. It would be appropriate at this time for all of us to recognize the sacrifice that our occupations could call for us to make.
So let’s give our EDM Heroes the credit for what they do, and the support for what they need. There is no group that is more deserving.
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