AMU Homeland Security Intelligence Middle East Opinion

Geneva II Gets Them Closer, Talking, Even If In Separate Rooms

Brett Daniel Shehadey
Special Contributor for In Homeland Security

Before Geneva II peace talks ever began, it was already a big failure and great disappointment to those people that are fully or not at all invested in them. For those that are fully invested with everything at stake, the talks are moving too slowly and unproductively. For those that are not heavily invested and or have nothing to lose either way, the much hyped-convention seems tragically an epic failure.

Neither the spectator nor critical player has the patience for a gradual dialogue to emerge and the much needed interaction of representatives from various sides of the conflict. The significance of calling forward and attending such talks is itself a breakthrough in a long drawn out war that could foreseeably find some kind of resolution after the negotiated success of the chemical weapons ban.

This is the normal process of lengthy and complex negotiations; especially in a bitter war in which each side believes they can hold out longer than the other. Moreover, there are more than just two simple sides but the greater bipolarity of the conflict presents the greatest gains which are polar opposites. They may not be equals at the table or feel much loving respect at the conference. Instead, the trick is to convince both sides that a continuation of conflict is worse than meeting your enemy.

The problem here is that each side misunderstands the nature of the talks. The Syrian Opposition, represented by the National Coalition and Syrian Interim Government, is engaging in regime change discussion with the present regime. Meanwhile, the active and current Syrian Government is engaging in what it believes is a negotiated cease-fire agreement for minor concessions and a stay in power.

The Geneva II Conference on Syria opened on January 22 in and concluded today, January 24. It was conducted by UN-Arab League special representative, Lakhdar Brahimi. Already, the absence of Iran and the presence of the Arab states created an initial imbalanced atmosphere.

Neither the Opposition nor the Syrian Government was in the same room at the same time with the UN mediators. While Syria is ready to meet with the Opposition leadership and negotiate, there are many in the Opposition that are not and will never be willing to meet with the Syrian Government.

Secretary of State John Kerry explained the US position: “What you see in the direct talks between the opposition and the Assad regime will not be the full measure of effort being expended in order to try to find a solution. Without going into any further detail, I will just say to you that lots of different avenues will be pursued, including continued support to the opposition and augmented support to the opposition.”
Short of sending troops on the ground, Washington is exploring all of its options and will be pursuing more of them to further a peaceful Syrian resolution.

The weakness of the talks cannot be overstated. The talks are largely an abstraction, not a full representation to parties involved in the Civil War. The Arab League is there, for example, Russia is there too. Iran is not, after humiliatingly being casually invited by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in private and then officially uninvited after pressure from Washington and Israel.

Obliviously, you will not see a good portion of the Syrian Opposition there who will not deal with Assad and had walked out on a vote to attend the talks. You will not see anyone from the extremist fighters that have played a major role in weakening Assad’s forces asking or seeking for peace through talks.

Secretary Kerry said that, “Assad has to decide that he is prepared to put the future of Syria ahead of himself. This is a man who has committed war crimes and still somehow wants to claim legitimacy to be able to govern the country.”

“Obviously he [Assad] is not ready at this point in time.” Assad’s envoy at the peace conference in Montreux, Switzerland vehemently rejected the demands of the opposition to step down. This has been their position all along, with the interjection and aim of a cease-fire and a false sense of boosted vigor from Western non-action and foreign backing.

Kerry: “Before Assad started killing his own people, these terrorists were not in Syria.”

As long as the War continues, international jihadist terrorists flock to it and emerge from it. This has largely been a grand incohesive effort by the anti-Syrian Government fighters, which is undermined by their own nature of differences, as al Qaeda and other extremists violently forced their way in and attacked the more moderate anti-Assad forces within the Syrian Opposition.

Just today, in an audio address, Al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahri demanded that jihadists direct their attacks at Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. But they might be in too deep and are not likely to yield to this decree. Previously, they were instructed to wage a sectarian war, along with their other al Qaeda affiliates in other parts. They face a three front war against Hezbollah, Iran and Syria, and the bulk of the Syrian Opposition. They broke their truce with the Syrian Opposition fighters and may not be able to acquire it again; especially if the US and Western powers move in to take advantage and aid the moderates and equal the playing field.

Two major centers of power, four major backers and many other factions, groups and extensions:
Pros-Assad powers: The Syrian Regime, the Russian and the Iranian alliance; and Hezbollah.
Anti-Assad powers: the Arabian states, the jihadists extremists and al Qaeda; the Western states and the Syrian Opposition.

The on-going outcome is a conflict of objectives. As time has progressed more radical rebels and terrorists rose to the challenge and objectives also shifted in response. The Americans originally wanted Assad gone at all costs as soon as possible in response to his massacring protestors and the onset of a just war. Then they were going to arm the Opposition back in June of this year without question until it became clear that secular democracy was no longer what they were fighting for and extremist jihadism crept in. Then the US was prepared to strike Assad from the sea due to chemical weapons violations, using them against his own people; which were later substantiated but the destruction of those chemical weapons stalled any direct US military intervention. The US and the West has largely been on the fence, not willing to rush into another war.

The Saudis and other Arab states were slow to come into the game; resting much of their hopes on Western intervention that did not come forward. The Russians and Iranians took advantage of the stalled support to the Syrian Opposition.

For the sake of simplicity, during the in-between, the Syrian Opposition was forced to make a deal with the devil and chose a truce with the extremist jihadist fighters with the common open objective of removing Assad from power. The West was shocked and appalled, stalled support even further; moderates were infiltrated by more radical Muslim elements and objectives; torture was previously and remained accusatory all around.

Yet, again, this failure at truce between extremists and moderate Muslim fighters within the Opposition allowed a dying Regime to reemerge and hold on. Yet a wounded Assad Regime then called for a cease-fire to consolidate his forces and end the war- an offer was refused by the rebels.
Presently, the situation needs order through a control factor. The 6.5 million internally displaced and 9.3 million Syrians demand humanitarian aid; as do the 2.5 million refugees along the border.

A cease-fire could be included to remove the Assad regime in a gradual transition; however, this will never be accepted by the hardliners of the Opposition, Assad himself or the Sunni extremists who know they will not achieve any power other than direct arms and terror. The regime may be willing to forestall some of its terror if international humanitarian forces enter the war-torn state. So long as Russia and Iran are placed into the mix, this is a potential seller for the regime.

All progress that is ongoing at the negotiation table will be affected by Sunni and Shia jihadist militants and other groups on the ground and that never attended and would continue to use explosives instead of words. Therefore it is additionally imperative to raise the question of neutralizing foreign jihadists from the fight as part of the negotiations- both primarily from Lebanon and from the Arab states- while seeking any core, mutual, objectives at the negotiation table.

Hopefully, future talks will bring about something more substancial: the removal of Assad is a supported Opposition dominant strategy; a temporary cease-fire is a Syrian dominant position; an exchange of captives might be possible if either side kept them; allowing the UN or international access to ransacked local communities in humanitarian capacity would be the timeliest of all delicate aims of building-trust at the table. Allowing Russian and Western advisers to eliminate the most radical terrorist groups might also be offered up. Everything remains on the table at this point- even if both sides repeatedly shout their positions- there are better solutions out there than the zero-sum aspects.

Convincing them to work with the more immediate problems- humanitarian and terrorist- is to the advantage of them both. The Opposition can recruit the people that lost home and family to their cause and neutralize their backstabbing foreign jihadists and the regime can eliminate the most extreme jihadist factions that will never offer them a ceasefire and plague them forever.

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