Brett Daniel Shehadey
Special Contributor for In Homeland Security
Terrorism is on the rise, not the decline. U.S. strategy of decapitating the leadership has predictably been near futile. While operationally and regionally, there is some progress, much of these are merely isolated short-term gains that do little with the safety of the American people or any actual progress in defeating the evolving international jihadist terrorism. A new approach is greatly needed, fast.
While some may go to the extreme to not only condemn these methods entirely, but to cite them as the key fault factor in international counterterrorism set-backs, the reality is more complicated. The US neglect for strategic resolve and their imprudent reliance on operations, regional obsession and over-reliance on tactical execution is a missed opportunity more than a cause in rising terror. A lack of right strategic action is the real policy problem and a narrow theater-by-theater military approach is the obstacle.
The major failures in the War on Terror are also frequently and falsely blamed on regional events more than the lack of effective actions and operations of the US government and its international allies. An events-focused analysis will highlight problems such as the Syrian Civil War or the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Yet these centers of jihad creation happen independent of US action.
First, one must perceive international jihad as currently independent, or at least semi-independent, from American operations. Whereas in the past, al Qaeda led a revolutionary Islamic extremist movement against the USA and incited a world of terrorism directed at the USA, this is no longer the case. The US is no longer the number one enemy, there are more pressing matters. In fact, by making the US enemy number two a self-sustaining terrorist movement finds itself a growing political contender for the entire Middle East, Central Asia and parts of Africa. Thus, terrorism is not dependent on the US or its actions; it has its own amorphous and adaptive sustenance.
The new theme is not retaliation against a “Satanic America” or Israel but a call to arms and the struggle for local and regional resurgence and political control through the insidious incitement of sectarian conflict and other manipulative measures. International jihadist are incorporating operations to influence or direct Sunni Islamist insurgencies, sympathy, propaganda and recruitment in or destined to key regional conflict areas. Tactics include: assassination, terror, suicide and targeted bombings, raids, sympathy, intimidation by torture, beheadings, kidnappings, etc.
Second, US counterterrorism policy has made it easier in some instances only by derailing an American strategic focus into a concentrated projection in limited arenas. Importantly, America has lost the power or the momentum to substantially dictate the terms regarding the War on Terrorism. It is no longer Washington that defines or limits the movements of the international jihadists. Previously they were on the defensive running and hiding. Now there is a resurgence, regrowth and redefining new operations and missions. Syria, however, cannot be balmed on the US- it is an internal civil war. Iraqi and Afghani instability on the other hand, and Pakistani in part, can be blamed on US military and political actions.
The US and allies are now forced into a position of trying to hold back a growing resurgence of terrorism with little success. New methods are insufficient, such as the diplomatic attempts at truce with the Afghani Taliban will not likely prevail in any lasting peace. This does not mean that diplomacy is ineffective, but whether the American people choose to exit a war with the enemy there, the Taliban will be at war with them. If you cannot neutralize them all with direct attacks, the next best thing is finding new methods not presently against an enemy that is set to attack the homeland so much as one that is taking advantage of all near-by political opportunities.
The major problem is one of local and regional political instability- which is a patented American diplomatic failure, more so than a military failure. The attempt to turn back time and retroactively put in use a larger “whole-of-government” approach has still not achieved a substantial maturity in critical areas. The American devotion to military and security resources and the operational “treatments” rather than the diplomatic, informational and intelligence strategic focus left many vulnerable states prey to such international jihadist influence. As with geopolitical rivalry, international Sunni jihadism seeks to establish itself as a leading political contender in the new Central Asia and Africa.
New terrorist safe havens or jihadists camps have sprung up in more and more places. Washington continues to favor US special operations and intelligence special activities as a cure-all for complex and growingly diverse enemy operations and strategic intent.
If America and partners show a willingness to substitute the strategic diplomatic, intelligence and informational national functions for military and intelligence operational methods, they will continue to see massive blowback. Military and intelligence operations are needed, but they are the first a result of the failure to implement the appropriate resources of other levels which precede them. By the time they are deployed, US political and information objectives have stalled or been defeated. Eventually, the US will not be able to put out all the fires on the prairie fields of Africa and Central Asia.
Firstly, all tactical strikes drone targeted killings and tactical raids should be limited to imminent national threats and friendly state support missions. If they are used at all, they must follow diplomacy, intelligence and informational strategic resources. Yet such cannot continue at the levels they were and be efficient or cost effective within the new strategic dynamic.
Diplomacy, intelligence and information must become the dominant players, using the military and the latter special missions as support roles. This does not mean that the US is prepared for such a transition. It is not. America’s informational, diplomacy and intelligence must be re-engineered to combat an adaptive pervasive ideological enemy and defeat them globally on a perceptional level. America is nowhere near this capacity. It does not need to spend much money to do so, but there must be a whole-of-government approach that shares a civil foreign relations end-state or strives for such goal. Discard the antiquated “us versus them” mentality of warfare and engage them in a more intelligence and informational based approach of infiltration, manipulation and influence; among others.
Third, leaving US national security or the War on Terrorism to foreign alliances, coalition partners or multinational operators is not good enough for the safety of the American people or the political well-being of the Afro-Asian regions. The ‘leading from behind’ foreign policy can be a powerful operational initiative to lower the US visibility but it falls short of any essential and needed grand strategy. America must also remain active abroad but not seen in its operational undertakings. On the surface, it must be as innocent as a lamb and as keen as a wolf.
Hypocrisy cannot be allowed to continue out in the highly visible wind of large-scale aggressive operations. Anything that the US does at all will be criticized by the enemy- anything except a state’s actions of moral legitimacy or universally accepted sovereign right. On the surface, there must be a new about face of total innocence; economic and innovative military power and strategic prudence. A shifting of alliance to realign the national interest and values should be applicable; particularly at the diplomatic and surface overt levels. The US should act as the wisest and most capable leader in diplomatic affairs; and with strategic intelligence and global information programs should lead political operations in non-lethal and indirect ways, where applicable.
Perception is central to a benign grand foreign affairs strategy- which must be created and is at present non-existent. The US must engage the world and the enemy with the power of words and words of power. It must be honest on the surface, principled, honorable, just, fair and benign in relations and actions.
As of now, the America appears weakened and two-faced at a time when the Islamic terrorists and militancy movement appear stronger and single-minded. Perception is not truth, but can mean victory or defeat; high or low morale for armed forces and security personnel; partner and potential partners. Moving foreign publics against the enemy must be an objective with and a purpose.
Washington must find ways in making the enemy appear far weaker and the US far more capable. Deeds of the enemy must be brought to light with truth campaigns and not ignored or sprinkled by a few words in an unbiased and ironically biased media environment that effectively objectifies terrorism.
A demonstration of power might be needed here and there but it all comes down to destroying the enemy’s credibility and incapacitating their ability to approach an audience with any confidence. It becomes increasing difficult to carry out without political embarrassments like Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria or Pakistan.
Such military vacuum states listed above have not been replaced with diplomacy, intelligence or information functions of national power. The US was a large balancer of military state power and such military state power was shipped back home or off to the Asia Pacific. There should have been a proportional transfer of national power, but there was not. It was not a simple pull-out that failed but an over-reliance on military national power and failure to substantially transition to critical national resources of state power.
The truth is that America did not and still does not have the appropriate measure of non-military state resources to follow any desired non-aggressive and indirect operations, or to follow the above prescription. Any hard fought stability in previous wars must be immediately followed by a total commitment full-force diplomatic, intelligence and information peace and economic programs.
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